Titan sub report reveals contributing factors that led to implosion

"Critically flawed" safety practices and a "toxic workplace culture" were among the contributing factors that led to the Titan submersible imploding on its way to the Titanic, a report has said.

The US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) said in its report into Oceangate - the private company that owned the submersible - that "the loss of five lives was preventable". Titan operator Stockton Rush, who founded OceanGate; two members of a prominent Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and his son Suleman; British adventurer Hamish Harding; and Titanic expert and the sub's pilot, Paul-Henri Nargeolet, died on board.

On Tuesday, a 335-page report into the disaster went on to make 17 safety recommendations, which MBI chairman Jason Neubauer said will help prevent future tragedies. The investigation's report found that the submersible's design, certification, maintenance and inspection process were all inadequate.

It also highlighted the fact that the company failed to look into known past problems with the hull, and issues with the expedition were not monitored in real time and acted upon. 'Intimidation tactics' The report states that contributing factors to the disaster included OceanGate's safety culture and operational practices being critically flawed, and an "ineffective whistleblower process" as part of the Seaman's Protection Act - a US federal law designed to protect the rights of seamen.

The report adds that the firing of senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired were used to dissuade employees and contractors from expressing safety concerns. It alleges: "For several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company's favourable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny.

"By strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges, OceanGate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols, which had historically contributed to a strong safety record for commercial submersibles." The report states that the chief executive was allowed to "completely ignore vital inspections, data analyses, and preventative maintenance procedures.