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The relative roles of U.S. ground and air power in major operations and campaigns have shifted since the end of the Cold War. To assess the shift between Army and Air Force roles, the author analyzed post-Cold War conflicts in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Because joint doctrine frequently reflects a consensus view rather than a truly integrated joint perspective, the author recommends that joint doctrine—and the processes by which it is derived and promulgated—be overhauled. The author also recommends reform for the services beyond major operations and campaigns to ensure that the United States attains its strategic objectives. This title was selected for the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Reading List.
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